the salt makers

If anything has been made clear in this debate, it is that the abortion issue is one seldom compromised via rational means.

As Hampton pointed out, the issue of abortion rests solely on definitions, themselves mereley subjections and assumptions. Although I can't help but agree that such lack of observation or objectively derived data regarding the "beginning of life" exist, I will contend that such ambiguity does not support a rationally sound acceptance of abortion as an unfortunate necessity that serves the greater good.

For now I will ignore my general distaste for this type of utilitarianism in disguise (Hampton, a classicist like yourself should be ashamed), and Hampton's moot appeal to ancient practices. These components of the argument, I will leave later posts. Rather, I will choose to argue my point in light of what we can learn from the practice of faith, and in doing so I do not intend to settle this argument once and for all, that is in a way which will satisfy really any party. I will state this very clearly: THE ISSUE OF ABORTION IS NOT ONE WHICH CAN BE SETTLE VIA PURELY RATIONAL MEANS. In the end, I believe we are best left with some manner of faith to which we must appeal in order to formulate our opinion.

I have chosen (in the interest of time) not to attack Zach's examples or Hampton's subsequent responses. Because it poses bigger questions than the issue of abortion, I will have to leave my objections to Hampton's submission to the greater good for later.

Instead I will submit the following quote from a prominent atheist, Bertrand Russell: "It is wrong always and under any circumstances to believe anything without sufficient evidence."

Now, one might find it strange to use Russell's imperative in support of a faith-based argument, but this is not a faith-based argument in the sense that it involves merely religious assumptions of morality (i.e. a Christian's unwavering acceptance of the will of God etc.).
Rather, I believe that in answering Russell's imperative when it is applied to the realm of morality and ethics, we can find an answer.

Applying Russell's thought to the situation at hand, we find that a tantamount circumstance to Russell's lack of sufficient evidence. This seems to be something we can agree on, namely that there isn't and most likely will never be sufficient evidence to prove when life begins. So what is a Russellian to do? If we follow Russell's imperative, we can, at best, become morally agnostic and abstain from making any judgement regarding abortion's morality. But this would be a dire mistake. Abortions are a current and growing practice, and I believe that apathy toward it is a far worse evil than whole-hearted acceptance or intolerance.

The only way to rectify Russell's imperative with a morally ambiguous situation is to behave "as if". In other words, because we're left with a very specific dichotomy of argument, we can easily choose one or the other equally unproven sides with which to work. Assuming that we can accept that it is generally better to preserve innocent human life than destroy it, regardless of our own morally suspect behavior (eg. Hampton's point re: Vegan's and Capital Punishment), one could respond to the Russellian scenario of ambiguity by saying it is better to act "as if" the child is alive.

In other words, what we're left with is Kierkegaardian dilemma of faith. We must choose, almost blindly, which situation is the better: Assuming the "greater good" in this situation is morally viable and in fact equal in moral value to the imperative that protects innocent human life, we must make a choice. This is where faith comes in: we must have Faith (not necessarily a religious one) that the best thing we can do is preserve that human life. We must have faith that a foetus is indeed more than just genetic puddy, that it is potential humanity awaiting it's arrival into kinetic actuality, and that despite the possibilities that such a child will be unwanted, deformed, or wholly evil, it is better in all situations to let it live.

At most, I think we can say that choosing the greater good is only to mire ourselves in further moral argument. Many will, and have, contended that such appeals to the greater good as a moral necessity is incorrect, and consequently the abortion issue will only further spiral into moral ambiguity. However, the choice to preserve innocent human life is one that is unequivocally correct, assuming we don't become monstrous as we had in the past a begin murdering retards and folks with broken legs like a pack of wild dogs (as hampton would seem to have us do). Admittedly, this is not the most philosophic of answers. It is a choice to believe in the sanctity of human life, and the possibility that it begins at conception. Although we can never know that this is the case, we must behave "as if" life begins there, and accordingly act to preserve. This is a movement of faith.

But this faith does not have to come from a deity's rule. It can from our own worst case, "as if" scenario: The one in which we must decide between 1) a supposed greater good, and embark into further moral debate, and 2) an assumption that renders a clear moral imperative, namely to protect human life.